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Abstract Transitions from unemployment into temporary work are often
succeeded by a transition from temporary into regular work. This paper
investigates whether temporary work increases the transition rate to regular
work. We use longitudinal survey data of individuals to estimate a multi-state
duration model, applying the ‘timing of events’ approach. The data contain
multiple spells in labour market states at the individual level. We analyse
results using novel graphical representations, which unambiguously show that
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temporary jobs shorten the unemployment duration, although they do not
increase the fraction of unemployed workers having regular work within a few
years after entry into unemployment.
Keywords Unemployment · Temporary work · Job search
JEL Classification J64 · C41
1 Introduction
Labour markets in many countries have displayed increases in flexible jobs—
particularly temporary jobs. An extensive debate has explored the extent to
which such jobs improve welfare and help individual workers. It is often argued
that the existence of temporary work is especially beneficial to currently
unemployed workers because it provides them opportunities to gain work
experience and acquire human capital, to deepen the attachment to the labour
market and to search more effectively for more desirable jobs. Temporary
job experience may reveal information regarding the ability and motivation
of the individual (screening or signalling). Some studies show that employers
indeed use atypical contracts as a way of screening for permanent jobs (e.g.
Storrie 2002; Houseman et al. 2003). Our paper examines the extent to which
temporary work facilitates individual unemployed workers to move from
unemployment to regular work—that is, the extent to which temporary work
acts as a stepping stone towards regular work. Some recent studies consider
the effect of temporary work on long-run employment outcomes using models
without potentially selective unobserved heterogeneity (Amuedo-Dorantes
2000; Hagen 2003). Hagen found a stepping-stone effect of temporary work
in Germany; Amuedo-Dorantes found none for Spain. Gagliarducci (2005)
considers the effect of the number of temporary jobs, taking selection effects
into account.
Our empirical analysis follows the ‘timing of events’ approach formalised
by Abbring and Van den Berg (2003). We use longitudinal survey data of
individuals to estimate a multi-state duration model. The model specifies the
transition rates from unemployment to temporary jobs, from temporary jobs to
regular work and from unemployment directly to regular work. Each transition
rate is allowed to depend on observed and unobserved explanatory variables
as well as on the elapsed time spent in the current state. To deal with selec-
tion effects, we allow the unobserved determinants to be dependent across
transition rates. For example, if more motivated individuals have not only less
trouble finding permanent jobs but are also over-represented among those in
temporary jobs, then a casual observer who does not take this into account
may conclude that there is a positive causal effect even if, in reality, there is
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none.1 We also exploit subjective responses on whether the individual desires
to have a regular job. We exploit the multi-spell nature of the data to reduce
the dependence of the results on functional form specifications. The ‘timing
of events’ approach exploits variation in observed moments of transitions in
order to distinguish empirically between causal effects and selection effects.
Expressed somewhat informally, if a transition to a temporary job is often
quickly succeeded by a transition into a regular job, for any constellation of
explanatory variables, then this is strong evidence of a causal effect.2
This paper adopts the specific model framework developed by Van den
Berg et al. (2002),3 for two reasons. First, their framework allows in a natural
way for ‘lock-in’ effects of temporary jobs (meaning that they may involve
a temporary standstill of search activities for other jobs). Secondly, it allows
for heterogeneous treatment effects (meaning that the effect of having a
temporary job on the transition rate to regular work may vary across ob-
served and unobserved individual characteristics). Because of lock-in effects
and effect heterogeneity, the parameter estimates are hard to interpret. We
contribute to the methodological literature by analysing this in some detail
and by developing a graphical procedure to express the main results.
The estimation results also shed light on whether individuals with a high
incidence and/or duration of unemployment flow into temporary work more
often and whether they benefit more from the stepping-stone effect of tempo-
rary work. More generally, we address whether individuals who benefit from
temporary work also have a high transition rate into temporary work. This is
important from a policy point of view. If certain types of individuals hardly ever
flow into temporary work (although their average duration until regular work
would be substantially reduced by it), then it may be sensible to stimulate the
use of temporary work among this group, for example by helping individuals
to register at temporary work agencies.
We abstract from effects of the existence of temporary jobs on the transition
rate from unemployment directly into regular work (i.e. without an intervening
temporary work spell). It can be argued that this effect is negative if a
temporary job facilitates a move to a regular job and if unemployed individuals
are aware of this. The data, however, do not allow for identification of this
1E.g. Purcell et al. (1999), Feldman et al. (2001) and Von Hippel et al. (1997) found low levels of
motivation among temporary workers.
2The approach does not require exclusion restrictions, instrumental variables, or conditional
independence assumptions. Recently, a number of studies have appeared in which the ‘timing of
events’ approach is applied to analyse the effects of dynamically assigned treatments on duration
outcomes (see Abbring and Van den Berg 2004, for an overview).
3Chalmers and Kalb (2001) employed the same method to analyse the effect of casual jobs
(i.e. those without holiday and sick leave entitlements), using the Survey of Employment and
Unemployment patterns 1994–1997 from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
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effect. We also abstract from equilibrium effects. Temporary employment
might improve the economic performance of firms because there is less need
to hoard workers as an insurance against a sudden upswing in demand (Pacelli
2006; Kahn 2000; Von Hippel et al. 1997). The use of temporary workers
may also reduce cyclical swings in labour productivity, since firms might be
better able to shed workers quickly during a downturn (Estevão and Lach
1999). Moreover, temporary contracts imply lower layoff costs and could thus
stimulate employment creation. The literature is not unanimous, however, on
the issue of how temporary employment affects the overall employment level.
The overview study of Ljungqvist (2002) shows that early general equilibrium
analyses by Burda (1992), Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) and Saint-Paul
(1995) display a negative effect of firing costs on employment, whereas later
general equilibrium models by Alvarez and Veracierto (2001) and Mortensen
and Pissarides (1999) conclude that firing costs affect employment positively.
Ljungqvist shows that the results of these theoretical models depend crucially
on the model features and assumptions.4 Also, partial equilibrium models
(such as Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992, 1994; Bentolila and Bertola 1990;
Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego 2008) and empirical work (e.g. Hunt 2000;
Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992; Aguirregabiria and Alonso-Borrego 2008) are
inconclusive.
To the extent that the data allow it, we examine how job characteristics
of regular jobs depend on whether they were directly preceded by a spell of
unemployment or whether there was an intermediate spell of temporary work
(see also Booth et al. 2002; Houseman 2003).5
Our results show that temporary jobs shorten the unemployment duration
but do not increase the probability of obtaining regular work within a few years
after entry into unemployment. Regular jobs found via temporary jobs do pay
higher wages than regular jobs found directly from unemployment.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the Dutch case of
temporary employment. Section 3 presents the model and defines the outcome
measures of our analysis. Section 4 presents the dataset, defines temporary
jobs, discusses some variables that we use in the analyses and provides descrip-
tive statistics. Section 5 discusses the estimation results, which are illustrated
with some graphical overviews. We draw conclusions on the stepping-stone
effect of temporary employment, covariate effects, the role of unobserved
heterogeneity and the quality of the jobs found. Section 6 concludes.
4In search and matching models with the standard assumption of a constant relative split in the
match surplus between firms and workers, layoff costs tend to increase employment by reducing
labour reallocation, whereas employment effects tend to be negative in models with employment
lotteries due to the diminished private return to work.
5We also check whether temporary work is associated with lack of training opportunities, as
suggested by Farber (1997, 1999), Arulampalam and Booth (1998), and Amuedo-Dorantes (2002).
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2 Temporary employment in the Netherlands
The Netherlands is an interesting case for studying the effects of temporary
employment. For decades, the Netherlands has been a frontrunner in tempo-
rary agency work, with little restrictions on its use (Grubb and Wells 1993;
OECD 1999; CIETT 2000; Eurociett 2007). In 1999, the remaining restrictions
on the use of agency work in transportation and construction were removed.
Now, only for seamen, a restriction is in place. The share of agency work in
overall employment is approximately 5% (CIETT 2000). In the beginning of
the 1990s, this was approximately 2% (Grubb and Wells 1993).
Regarding fixed-term employment, the Netherlands is not very strictly
regulated either (Grubb and Wells 1993; OECD 1999, 2004). Since long,
employers in the Netherlands are allowed to use these contracts without
many restrictions. The main restriction concerns the number of consecutive
fixed-term contracts allowed. Until 1999, only one subsequent fixed-term
contract was allowed; since 1999, three consecutive fixed-term contracts can be
used. The share of fixed-term employment in the overall employment rate is
approximately 15%. In the beginning of the 1990s, this was about 9% (Grubb
and Wells 1993). Approximately 60% of new jobs are fixed term (these and
other figures are from the national labour inspection). A special case is the
fixed-term contract with an explicit agreement to convert into an open-ended
contract in case of good performance. This agreement can be legally enforced,
irrespective whether the intention is made on paper or verbal. More than half
of all fixed-term contracts are concluded on this basis (Fouarge et al. 2006). As
we shall argue later, we exclude this type of fixed-term contracts in our analysis
from our definition of temporary jobs.
On-call contracts are the most flexible direct hire labour contract available.
Since the 1980s, these contracts have been used on a rather large scale. In 1997,
13% of private sector employment was on an on-call basis, which by 2003 was
reduced to 5%. Until 1999, there were no conditions on the maximum duration
of zero-hour contracts and min–max contracts6 and the minimum number of
hours paid per call. Since 1999, when the Flexibility and Security Act was
enacted, there is a minimum number of hours paid, and the maximum duration
of the fully flexible contract is restricted to the first 6 months.
OECD (2004) empirically established that temporary employment is posi-
tively related to employment protection of open-ended employment contracts.
Employment protection for open-ended contracts in the Netherlands is rather
strict (OECD 1999, 2004). The Dutch system is rather complicated and
6In this type of contract the minimum and sometimes maximum number of hours worked per week
are put down in the contract.
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scores especially high on procedural inconveniences. There are no severance
payments by law if the dismissal is handled by the employment office (CWI).7
However, if the employer files for permission by a labour court, the court may
determine severance pay, roughly according to the formula: 1 month/year of
service for workers <40 years of age; 1.5 months for workers between age 40
and 50; 2 months for workers 50 years and over. Approximately half of all
dismissals is handled by the employment office, the other half goes through
labour court.
3 Model specification
3.1 Transition rates
This paper applies the ‘timing of events’ methodology. We adopt the model
framework of Van den Berg et al. (2002), which was constructed to study
the use of trainee positions in the Dutch medical profession. In our context,
the model specifies the transition rates from unemployment to temporary
employment, from unemployment to regular employment and from temporary
employment to regular employment. In general, the transition rate or hazard
rate θ ij is defined as the rate at which an individual flows from one state
i to another state j, given that (s)he survived in state i until the current
moment. We define the indices i and j to have the following values: U =
unemployment, T = temporary employment and R = regular employment.
We specify a mixed proportional hazard model for each transition rate. Let
observed characteristics be denoted by x and the baseline hazard by λij(.),
for the transition rate from state i to state j. In addition, β ij is a vector of
parameters to be estimated. The multiplicative unobserved random terms vij
are state- and exit-destination-specific. Then,
θij
(
t| x, vij
) = λij (t) eβ
/
ijx+vij
and the corresponding survival function equals
Si
(
t| x, vij
) = exp
⎛
⎝−
∑
j∈(U,T,R), j=i
∫ t
0
θij
(
s |x , vij
)
ds
⎞
⎠ .
7If the employer can prove to the employment office that a dismissal is legitimate, he gets a layoff
permit, which means he does not have to pay any severance payment. A dismissal is legitimate in
case of financial necessity, unsuitability or blameworthy behaviour of the employee.
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Note that this imposes that the hazard rates depend only on the elapsed
duration in the current state and not on earlier outcomes.8
We define an unemployment spell as the time span between entry into
unemployment and entry into either regular or temporary work. A temporary
job spell is defined as the time span between the start of the first temporary
job and entry into regular employment. Thus, a temporary job spell may
consist of multiple periods of (short) unemployment and temporary job spells.
The total spell between the start of unemployment and regular employment
is the sum of the unemployment spell and, if applicable, the temporary job
spell. In our data, we observe more than one of these ‘total’ spells per
individual. For a given individual, the values of vij of the same kind are
assumed to be identical across different spells. The unobserved heterogeneity
terms vij capture selective inflow into temporary work and permanent work.
For example, the observed transition rate from temporary work to regular
work may be higher than the observed rate from unemployment to regular
work just because individuals for whom it is easy to find regular work tend
to self-select into temporary work. Then, vUT is positively related to vUR and
vT R. It is also possible that persons who most easily find regular work find
or accept a temporary job less quickly, which means that vUT and vUR are
negatively related. With unobserved heterogeneity, the likelihood function
is not separable in the parameters of different transition rates. Abbring and
Van den Berg (2003) analyse the identification of these types of models. The
availability of multiple spell data is useful in the sense that fewer assumptions
are needed for identification, and the empirical results are, therefore, less
sensitive to aspects of the model specification.9 In particular, in multi-spell
duration analysis, as in fixed-effects panel data analysis, the results do not
critically depend on the assumption that observed and unobserved explanatory
variables are independent.
An important condition for identification concerns the absence of anticipa-
tion of the moment of the start of a temporary job. This means, essentially,
that the individual should not know more about the moment this job starts
8With individual-specific random effects, including individual past labour market outcomes as
explanatory variables is difficult as it gives rise to initial-conditions problems, unless the data
contain a natural starting point of each individual labour market history, like the moment of
school-leaving. We therefore do not include such past outcomes. By implication, the individual
treatment effects defined below do not directly depend on e.g. past annual earnings, but at most
on the observed and unobserved determinants of past outcomes. Wooldridge (2005) develops an
alternative approach to deal with initial-conditions problems in dynamic panel data. This involves
specifying the individual effect in terms of the initial observed value of the outcome and in terms of
exogenous variables. This approach is less suitable for our purposes, because the length of the first
spell is often not observed due to left-censoring. Additional practical concerns are that the number
of observed previous spells and the number of panel survey interviews vary across individuals,
and that we have multi-dimensional unobserved individual effects and outcomes, exacerbating the
computational costs.
9See also Abbring and Van den Berg (2004) for comparisons to inference with latent variable
methods and panel data methods.
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than is captured by the modelled distribution of the duration until the start
of a temporary job. In our context, anticipation occurs if the individual stops
looking for regular work (or, more generally, decreases his transition rate
into regular work) at the moment that it becomes certain that he will enter a
temporary job in a certain time period from now. If this were the case, and the
researcher does not observe the moment of this decision, then the estimates of
current transition rates are determined by future events. As far as we know,
there are no numbers available on this phenomenon. The scenario seems
unlikely to be distorting in the present set-up. From a dynamic (search) point of
view, it is unlikely that people know in advance the exact moment at which they
will find a temporary job. In any search model, the moment at which a match
between a worker and a temporary job is realised is not fully in the hands of
the unemployed worker, especially since temporary workers are often called
at short notice. The worker can, at most, determine the rate at which the match
is realised, and this leaves some randomness in the realised moment. This
implies that the way in which search frictions are usually modeled—as random
arrivals of trading opportunities—has fruitful applications in the literature on
treatment evaluation, and we use it as such in this paper. Against this, one
may argue that some individuals are registered at temporary work agencies
as looking for such jobs; this is unobserved, however, and these individuals
may have a higher rate of moving from unemployment to temporary work.
This is captured in our model as unobserved and observed10 heterogeneity.
The model framework we use is designed to disentangle selection effects from
causal effects. This selection effect can certainly be a self-selection effect (as is
the case if some individuals search for temporary jobs and others do not).
3.2 Parameterisation
We follow the literature by taking the duration dependence functions (or
baseline hazards) λij(t) to have piecewise constant specifications. We subdivide
a duration axis into eight quarterly intervals for the first 2 years, followed by
two half-year intervals for the third year, and an open interval for durations of
more than 3 years. These intervals capture the empirical shapes rather well.
We directly follow the specifications of Card and Sullivan (1988) and Van
den Berg et al. (2002) for the multivariate distribution of the unobserved
heterogeneity terms. Let vijn denote a realisation of the random variable vij.
Types of individuals are characterised by a unique set of values of vUT , vUR,
vTR. The application used in this study allows for two possible realisations for
each vij, so n = 1, 2. We take the locations of the mass points as well as the
associated probabilities to be unknown parameters. In addition, we impose
the condition that if vUR = vURn then vT R = vT Rn. This effectively assumes
that individuals who more easily find regular work from unemployment also
10The data contain an explanatory variable indicating whether the individual, when unemployed,
prefers temporary work to regular work.
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find regular work more easily from a temporary position. This specification
results in four different types of individuals (four different combinations of
mass points) and six mass point parameters. Note that the combination of
mass points (vUT , vUR, vT R) replaces the constants in the vector of regression
coefficients and, thus, are identified. The relation between the elements of
(vUT , vUR, vT R) does not need to be monotone. As mentioned before, the
extent to which vUT is related to vUR andvT R determines the extent to which
selectivity affects the association between having had temporary work or not
on the one hand and entering regular work on the other.
3.3 Quantities of interest
3.3.1 Stepping-stone effect
The stepping-stone effect is defined as the increase in the hazard rate of finding
regular employment as a result of the acceptance of a temporary job. This
stepping-stone effect is not represented by a single model parameter. To see
this, note that in our parameterization, the transition rate from unemployment
into regular work depends on the time elapsed since entry into unemployment
(t), whereas the rate from temporary work to regular work depends on the time
elapsed since entry into temporary work (τ ). Both of these exhibit distinctive
duration dependence patterns. It would be absurd to only allow for depen-
dence on the duration since entry into unemployment, in light of the fact that
temporary jobs may involve a lock-in effect, causing the transition rate into
regular work to be lower right after having entered a temporary job and higher
some time later. As a result, the causal effect of having moved into temporary
work at a given time tUT on the individual transition rate into regular work
at time t > tUT , compared to not having entered temporary work until and
including t, equals
θT R (t, τ |x , vT R)
θU R (t |x , vU R) − 1, where t = tUT + τ . This means that a
comparison of the hazard rate from unemployment to (regular) work with and
without the treatment cannot be represented by one parameter. Of course, it
is still interesting to examine the duration dependence patterns and average
levels of transitions into regular work. For example, if for an individual with
given values of x and v, it always holds that θT R (τ |x , vT R) > θU R (t |x , vU R),
then the individual effect of temporary jobs on the duration until regular work
is positive at all points of time. The results are presented in Section 5.1.
3.3.2 Share of individuals finding regular employment via temporary work
Given the complexity of the model, a quantitative assessment of the over-all
effect of temporary work is more easily studied with an outcome measure that
aggregates over effects on instantaneous transition rates, than by studying the
instantaneous transition rates themselves. For this purpose, we use the cumu-
lative probability of moving into a regular job, measured at various points of
time after entry into unemployment. Therefore, we compare the (cumulative)
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probability of moving into regular work directly from unemployment with the
(cumulative) probability of moving into regular work from unemployment via
temporary work. We quantify these probabilities by using the estimated model.
The cumulative probability of moving into regular work within t periods after
having entered unemployment equals
t∫
0
θUR (y) SUR (y) SUT (y) + θUT (y) SUT (y) SUR (y) (1 − STR (t − y)) dy
(1)
where the indices of S refer to the corresponding duration variable (i.e. SUT
is the survivor function of the duration from unemployment into temporary
work). The first part of the expression equals the probability of moving into
regular work by way of a direct transition from unemployment, whereas
the second part equals the probability of moving into regular work by way
of temporary work. Logically, the probability of moving into regular work
directly from unemployment does not converge to 1 as t goes to infinity, if
θUT > 0. The relevant population estimate of Eq. 1 follows by integration
of the total expression over the distribution of observed and unobserved
characteristics.
The decomposition of Eq. 1 into its two terms does not capture a causal
effect of temporary work. To see this, note that both terms are positive even if
there is no effect at the individual level (i.e. if the states of unemployment
and temporary work are equivalent in the sense that the transition rate
from temporary work to regular work at any calendar time point equals the
transition rate from unemployment to regular work that would have prevailed
at that point). Instead, the decomposition of Eq. 1 represents the population
fraction of unemployed individuals who find regular work through either the
temporary work channel or the direct channel. Results of this decomposition
are presented in Section 5.2.
3.3.3 Effect of temporary work on the probability of regular employment
One can define a sensible average causal effect of temporary work on the prob-
ability of having had regular work at t periods after entry into unemployment,
by comparing the actual magnitude of Eq. 1 to the magnitude in a situation
where temporary employment is not available. We can quantify the probability
of regular work within t periods in the absence of temporary work by imposing
in Eq. 1 that the transition rate into temporary work θUT equals zero, resulting
in the expression
t∫
0
θUR(y)SUR(y)dy. This holds both for the general model
parameterisation in which θT R is also allowed to depend on the time t since
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entry into unemployment, as well as for our actual parameterisation.11 This is
demonstrated formally in the Appendix. The effect that we calculate here may
be called a time-aggregated stepping-stone effect. It captures to what extent
the duration until regular work is shortened by the existence of temporary
jobs. Results of this effect are presented in Section 5.3.
Some comments are in order. First, in the absence of temporary work, some
of the individuals who would otherwise have moved into regular work by
way of a temporary job move into regular work directly from unemployment.
Therefore, the cumulative fraction of individuals moving into regular work that
we calculate exceeds the observed fraction of individuals who move directly
from unemployment into regular work. The estimated cumulative probability
of moving into regular work from unemployment, which in the presence of
temporary work converges to one minus the cumulative probability of moving
into temporary work from unemployment, is thus extrapolated to converge to
1 as t goes to infinity. This assumes the same pattern of duration dependence
and relative effects of the explanatory factors. This means that we abstract
from potential effects of the mere existence of temporary jobs on the transition
rate from unemployment directly into regular work. In particular, this rules out
that unemployed individuals make their search effort for regular jobs depen-
dent on the availability of temporary jobs. Second, all these calculations at
the micro-level assume that on the macro level the absence of temporary jobs
does not affect the magnitude of the direct transition rate from unemployment
to regular work (recall the discussion in Section 1). Among the many reasons
why this assumption may be incorrect is the possibility of equilibrium effects
on the demand and supply of regular jobs. Third, it is not possible to test
non-parametrically whether the curve described by (1) is different from the
curve obtained by imposing θUT = 0, simply because the curve obtained by
imposing θUT = 0 is counterfactual and therefore cannot be estimated non-
parametrically.
3.3.4 Effect of temporary work on the probability of employment
Another effect of temporary work can be defined as the effect of tempo-
rary employment on the probability of having started regular or temporary
employment at t periods after entry into unemployment. This is one minus
the probability of still being unemployed at t. The cumulative probability of
11The fact that we allow βU R to be different from βT R and that we allow vU R/vT R to be different
across individuals means that we allow the individual effects of temporary work to differ between
individuals. The average effects can then be obtained by averaging the individual effect over x
and v.
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moving into regular or temporary work within t periods after having entered
unemployment equals
t∫
0
θUR (y) SUR (y) SUT (y) + θUT(y) SUT (y) SUR(y) dy (2)
By analogy to the quantification of the effect of temporary jobs on the
probability of regular work, the effect of temporary jobs on the employment
probability can be quantified by imposing in Eq. 2 the condition that the
transition rate into temporary work θUT equals zero, resulting in the expression
t∫
0
θUR(y) SUR(y) dy.
The difference between these two expressions captures the extent to which
unemployment is shortened by the existence of temporary employment. Even
if we do not find an effect of the existence of temporary work on the probability
of regular work (as described in Section 3.3.3), we might find an effect on the
unemployment probability if the temporary job spell is simply an alternative
for an equally long time searching from unemployment. Results of this analysis
are presented in Section 5.4.
4 Data
This paper uses a sub-sample of the OSA labour supply panel, which is a
longitudinal panel dataset collected by the Dutch Institute for Labour Studies
(OSA). It follows a random sample of Dutch households over time since
1985, by way of biannual face-to-face interviews. The survey concentrates on
individuals between the ages of 16 and 64 years, and who are not full-time
students. For more background information on the data, the effect of attrition
and references to other studies using these data, see e.g. Van den Berg and
Lindeboom (1998) and Van den Berg et al. (1994). We use data from 1988 to
2000. Our sample consists of all survey participants who became unemployed
at least once during this period. For this group, we analyse the unemployment
duration and search durations until temporary and regular employment for a
maximum of three unemployment spells per individual. This results in a sample
of 976 individuals, with a total number of 1,175 unemployment spells.
People are defined as unemployed when they do not have a job but are
looking for one. One does not need to receive unemployment benefits to be
unemployed. We define regular work as being in a job that is a permanent job
or being in a job with a limited-duration contract with an explicit agreement to
become permanent in case of good performance. We define temporary jobs as
more contingent types of jobs: fixed-term jobs without an explicit agreement to
become permanent, temporary agency work, on-call contracts and subsidised
temporary jobs. It should be noted that in the Netherlands, contrary to certain
other countries, unemployed individuals who are registered at commercial
temporary work agencies, but are currently not assigned to an employer, do
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Table 1 Job characteristics temporary versus regular jobs (standard error in parentheses)
Temporary jobs Regular jobs Difference
Monthly wage (Euros) 1,599 (158) 2,029 (196) −430a
Hourly wage (Euros) 14.2 (1.8) 15.0 (2.3) −0.8a
Working hours per week 28.4 (2.1) 31.0 (1.5) −2.6a
Employer financed training (percentage) 20.6 (22.4) 32.8 (14.2) −12.2a
aStatistical difference at 1% confidence level
not receive wage income and are considered to be unemployed. This also
applies to our data. Some studies treat part-time employment as a form of non-
standard employment. Since most part-time employment in the Netherlands
is on a voluntary basis, we treat part-time employment in the same way as
regular employment. This implies that it can be either regular or temporary,
depending on the duration of the contract. Our classification of temporary
versus regular jobs does not exclude the possibility that a regular job can be
a bad job as well. Table 1, however, indicates that if we consider wages and
training opportunities, the regular jobs obtained by previously unemployed
workers are, on average, more attractive than the temporary jobs.
Table 2 provides the labour market positions of our sample at two con-
secutive interview dates. Remember that everyone in our sample is unem-
ployed at least once during the period 1988–2000. As a result, transitions to
unemployment are higher than in a random sample of the Dutch workforce.
The transition rates are roughly consistent with earlier findings both in the
Netherlands and other Western countries (e.g. Dekker 2007, p. 133; Segal and
Sullivan 1997). Transitions from temporary jobs to regular work are frequent;
indeed, they are more frequent than transitions from unemployment to regular
work.
Table 2 Labour market transitions in our sub-sample, 1988–2000 (percentages)
Labour force Labour force status survey year t+2
status survey Out of the Unemploymenta Temporary Regular Share in
year t labour (%) employment employment labour force
force (%) (%) (%) 1998b (%)
Out of the 58 26 7 9 23
labour force
Unemployment 22 32 16 30 3
Temporary 6 21 35 38 9
employment
Regular 3 18 8 71 64
employment
aTransitions to unemployment are relatively frequent in our sample since we select only those who
are observed to become unemployed at least once
bCalculations based on OSA wave 1998. Regular employment includes 4% fixed-term contracts
with extension to permanent at the end (if screening is successful)
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Fig. 1 Labour market
transitions in the dataset
In the OSA panel, an effort is made to collect extensive information on the
labour market histories of the individual respondents. Individuals are asked
about their labour market status 2 years ago (the previous interview date),
about all transitions made since then, and about their current labour market
status. For every transition, we observe when it happened, why it happened,
by which channel the new position was found and what the respective labour
market positions were. Regarding the labour market position after a change,
individuals can choose from the following: other function with same em-
ployer, employee at other employer, self-employed, co-working partner of self-
employed, no paid job but looking for one, no paid job and not looking for one,
military service and full-time education. From these labour market histories,
we obtain both the sequence of labour market states occupied and the sojourn
times in these states. Figure 1 shows the total number of observed labour
market transitions in our sub sample. Note that some types of transitions do
not play a role in the empirical analysis below (in particular, the transitions to
and from ‘not in the labour force’, the transitions to unemployment and the
transitions from regular employment to temporary employment). This is due
to an insufficient number of observations of such transitions.
With regard to the employment positions at the survey moments, we
observe the wage, number of hours worked, industry, occupation, type of
work and type of contract. Less information is available for periods between
survey moments, which leads to two problems. First, we do not observe many
characteristics of jobs that start and end between two consecutive interviews.
Notably, we often do not observe the wage of such jobs.12 This implies that the
set of explanatory variables that we can use is restricted mostly to background
12We observe the wage for 379 of the total of 507 regular jobs that are found by our sample after
their spell of unemployment.
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Table 3 Sample averages of dependent and explanatory variables
Variable All observations Observations Observations
with transition with transition
unemployment unemployment
to regular to temporary
Unemployment 16.4 (19.9) 15.4 (17.8) 18.0 (22.8)
spell in months (if completed)
Temporary job 20.1 (13.1) – 20.1 (13.3)
spell in months (if completed)
Intermittent unemployment 1.0 (2.7) – 1.0 (2.7)
in temporary job spell
in months (if completed)
Age (at start 33.0 (10.40) 31.9 (9.50) 32.4 (9.70)
unemployment) in years
Female 0.56 (0.50) 0.49 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50)
Ethnic minority 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.13) 0.01 (0.10)
Education:
Low 0.32 (0.47) 0.29 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46)
Medium 0.55 (0.50) 0.57 (0.50) 0.58 (0.49)
High 0.13 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.32)
Region:
Randstad 0.11 (0.31) 0.13 (0.33) 0.05 (0.21)
West 0.24 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 0.30 (0.46)
North 0.13 (0.34) 0.12 (0.31) 0.14 (0.35)
East 0.20 (0.40) 0.23 (0.43) 0.16 (0.37)
South 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.44) 0.31 (0.46)
Children:
No children at home 0.58 (0.49) 0.55 (0.50) 0.57 (0.49)
Man with children at home 0.15 (0.35) 0.20 (0.40) 0.14 (0.36)
Woman with children at home 0.27 (0.45) 0.25 (0.43) 0.29 (0.44)
Partner:
Single 0.43 (0.50) 0.32 (0.47) 0.46 (0.50)
Man with working partner 0.11 (0.32) 0.16 (0.38) 0.13 (0.33)
Woman with working partner 0.29 (0.46) 0.32 (0.46) 0.27 (0.45)
Man with non-working partner 0.11 (0.32) 0.15 (0.37) 0.10 (0.30)
Woman with non-working partner 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.04 (0.190)
Desired number of working hours 31.3 (10.8) 32.7 (11.3) 31.9 (9.6)
Temp job preferred 0.07 (0.25) 0.04 (0.19) 0.11 (0.20)
(at start unemployment)
Vacancies/Unemployment ratio 0.19 (0.15) 0.18 (0.13) 0.16 (0.12)
Number of observations 1,175 367 259
Standard deviations in parentheses
characteristics of the individual (listed in Table 3).13 Second, it is not always
clear whether a job that begins and ends between two consecutive interviews
is temporary or not. In case of doubt, we infer the type of contract from other
variables. We use the stated channel by which the job was found (this can be a
temporary help agency) and the stated reason why transitions into and out of
the job are made (to get more job security or because of the end of contract,
13Information on the labour market tightness, particularly the unemployment/vacancy ratios per
education level at the start of unemployment, comes from Netherlands Statistics (CBS).
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respectively). In some cases, these variables are missing, and we right-censor
the unemployment spell at the moment of the transition into such a job. The
latter occurred in 12% of all spells.
Because we know the sequence of labour market states occupied and the
sojourn times in these states, we can determine the unemployment spell—
the duration between the start of unemployment and the moment at which
the individual moves into either regular or temporary work—and the tempo-
rary job spell—the duration from the start of a temporary job until the moment
at which the individual moves to a regular job. A temporary job spell ends
with a regular job at the same employer or at another employer. We do not
distinguish between these possibilities. Summary statistics for the unemploy-
ment spells and temporary job spells are given in Table 3. As mentioned in
Section 3, the latter duration period may include intermittent temporary jobs
and periods of unemployment in-between. Only 12% of all temporary job
spells contain an intermittent period of unemployment. As Table 3 shows,
a temporary job spell consists on average of 1 month of unemployment and
19 months of employment in temporary job(s).
All of these durations may be right-censored due to a transition to another
labour market state or due to reaching the end of the observation window. We
do not include unemployment spells that started before the first interview, so
there are no left-censoring problems that arise with interrupted spells.14
5 Estimation results
5.1 Stepping-stone effect
We now discuss the results for the complete model.15 We start with the
shapes of the individual transition rates as functions of the elapsed durations
in the states under consideration. Given the initial level of a transition rate
(i.e., upon entry into the state under consideration), the shape of this rate
is described by the parameters of the duration dependence function (see
the estimates in Table 4 and Fig. 2). Apart from these duration dependence
parameters, the specifications only include time-invariant covariates. The rate
into temporary work from unemployment is smaller than the rate into regular
work. However, once an individual is in temporary employment, the rate
14Strictly speaking we do not solve for initial conditions since we do not fully observe the previous
employment history of all cases.
15The estimates were computed with GAUSS, using the standard maximum likelihood application
MAXLIK. The programming of the likelihood function was based on a range of available
programs for the “Timing of Events” approach. The likelihood function of the base model
was optimized in 265 iterations, using the Broyden, Fletcher, Goldfarb and Shanno (BFGS)
optimization algorithm and a numerical gradient with a tolerance level of 10−4 for the gradient of
the estimated coefficients. Identical results were obtained using different numbers of individuals,
a wide range of different starting values, and different optimization algorithms (like the Newton-
Raphson method and the Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman method).
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Table 4 Estimation results for the log duration dependence functions
Time interval Unemployment Unemployment Temporary
(reference 0–3 months) to temporary work to regular work to regular work
4–6 months 0.278 (0.114) 0.536 (0.120) −0.063 (0.193)
7–9 months 0.257 (0.133) 0.485 (0.125) 0.101 (0.121)
10–12 months 0.519 (0.176) 0.728 (0.117) 0.394 (0.137)
13–15 months −0.167 (0.198) 0.687 (0.120) 0.704 (0.155)
16–18 months 0.396 (0.191) 0.692 (0.145) 0.523 (0.137)
19–21 months 0.646 (0.242) −0.165 (0.249) 0.855 (0.132)
22–24 months 1.235 (0.243) 1.369 (0.159) 1.735 (0.184)
25–30 months 1.332 (0.272) 1.402 (0.159) 1.738 (0.193)
31–36 months 0.550 (0.377) 1.963 (0.201) 1.777 (0.226)
>36 months 1.246 (0.249) 1.749 (0.214) 1.691 (0.235)
Standard errors in parentheses
of flowing into regular work is at some time after the start of the search
larger than otherwise. One might expect workers who accept a temporary
job to be initially strongly attached to that job—for example, for contractual
reasons. This is true in some sense. Newly employed temporary workers have
a slightly lower rate into regular work than unemployed workers. Until 1 year
after the start of the temporary job, the transition rate to regular work is
lower than the transition rate from unemployment to regular work. After a
period of 1.5 years, however, the transition rate from temporary into regular
employment increases substantially. This does not correspond to any binding
legal restriction in the length of temporary work (see Section 2), as in e.g. Guell
and Petrongolo (2007). After 30 months, we are left with only 225 observations
in the data, which makes the estimated hazards, and the observed jumps in the
transition rates, rather imprecise. The jumps in the hazard rates could be due to
the loss of wage-related unemployment benefits for many of the unemployed.
As the typical time between consecutive panel survey waves is 2 years, recall
errors in responses on retrospective transitions could explain some heaping
in durations around 2 years, but this does not explain jumps or heaping after
2 years.16
The finding that the transition rate from temporary work to regular work
increases during the temporary job indicates that the accumulation of human
capital may be a major reason for employers to prefer individuals who have
occupied a temporary job. An increasingly larger social network among em-
ployed workers may also explain this. Apparently, for prospective employers,
being in a temporary job constitutes more than just a (positive) signal that one
has been found acceptable for such a job. As mentioned before, temporary
16Recall errors may also result in the non-observation of short spells. This has been studied
extensively in French longitudinal panel survey data on employment outcomes (see Van den Berg
and Van der Klaauw 2001, for an overview) and the results have been found to be rather insensitive
to this, with the exception of seasonal effects which are not a concern in the present paper.
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Fig. 2 Estimated transition rates for the average individual
job spells may include periods of intermittent unemployment. Obviously,
human capital and social networks do not expand during these intermittent
periods of unemployment. As shown in Section 4, this holds true for only
12% of all temporary job spells. As a sensitivity analysis, we include a dummy
variable for these observations as an additional covariate. The main results are
unaffected by this (these and other non-reported estimates are available on
request). In particular, the estimated time-aggregated effects on probabilities
(see Subsections 5.3 and 5.4 below) are virtually equal to those for the baseline
model.
In another sensitivity analysis, we estimate an extended model in which the
transition rate from temporary work to regular work depends on the time spent
unemployed before entry into the temporary job (as an additional covariate).
The corresponding coefficient is insignificant.
In the main set of results, transitions to non-participation are treated as
censored at the moment of such a transition. As a sensitivity analysis, we
excluded the 120 observations for whom a transition to non-participation was
observed. This did not result in any major changes in estimated coefficients.
Note that the results are not due to selection effects, since we corrected
for observed and unobserved heterogeneity. As indicated earlier, the selection
effect for which we correct might well be a self-selection effect, as is the case
if some individuals search for temporary jobs and others do not. This selection
is captured as unobserved and observed heterogeneity with, respectively,
the mass points for unobserved heterogeneity and an explanatory variable
indicating whether the unemployed individual prefers temporary work to
regular work. Because the unobserved heterogeneity terms correct for the
fact that individuals that are still in unemployment at long durations have low
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job-finding probabilities, the estimated hazard rates in a model without un-
observed heterogeneity terms are higher at low durations and lower at long
durations than in Fig. 2. This holds true especially for transitions from unem-
ployment.
5.2 Share of individuals finding regular employment via temporary work
We now turn to the quantification of the share of individuals finding regular
employment via temporary work, as presented in Section 3.3.2. The solid
curve in Fig. 3 displays the cumulative probability of moving into regular
work, whether directly or via the temporary work channel, as a function of
the time elapsed since entry into unemployment. This is obtained by using
the estimated model to calculate expression (1) for each individual in the
sample and for all possible combinations of vij’s weighted by the estimated
p’s. Similarly, the dashed curve visualises the probability of moving into
regular work without an intermediate spell of temporary work, applying the
decomposition of expression (1) as described in Section 3.3.2. After 6 months,
12% of the flow into regular work consisted of transitions through temporary
work, while after 72 months, this percentage increased to 43%.
5.3 Effect of temporary work on the probability of regular employment
Figure 4 describes the effect of temporary work on the probability of having
had regular work as defined in Subsection 3.3.3. The dashed curve in Fig. 4
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Fig. 3 Estimated probability of moving to regular work, directly or through temporary work
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Fig. 4 Estimated cumulative probability of finding regular work, with and without temporary
employment
plots the estimated counterfactual cumulative probability of moving into regu-
lar work if there is no temporary employment. This is obtained by imposing
in Eq. 1 the condition that the transition rate into temporary work equals
zero, taking again averages across individuals in the sample and across the
vij’s. For comparison, the solid curve of Fig. 3 is repeated in Fig. 4. The two
curves are virtually the same, indicating that on average, the probability of
finding regular work is the same in a situation with temporary employment as
it is in a situation in which no temporary employment exists. If anything, the
cumulative probability of moving to regular employment is, at some points,
slightly lower in a situation with temporary employment. The lock-in effect of
temporary work is then, on average, slightly larger than the positive effect of
temporary work on reaching regular work. Later, subsections examine whether
this result is uniformly valid for all types of individuals. Estimates of a model
without unobserved heterogeneity show a similar effect.
5.4 Effect of temporary work on the probability of employment
Figure 5 shows the effect of the existence of temporary jobs on the probability
of (re)employment as defined in Subsection 3.3.4. The dashed curve in Fig. 5
plots the estimated cumulative counterfactual probability of moving into work
if there is no temporary employment. This is obtained by imposing in Eq. 2
the condition that the transition rate into temporary work equals zero, taking
averages across individuals in the sample and across the vij’s. The solid curve
of Fig. 5 presents the (re)employment probability in the factual situation, in
which regular and temporary jobs coexist. The job-finding probability in the
situation without temporary employment is smaller than in the situation in
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Fig. 5 Estimated cumulative reemployment probability, with and without temporary employment
which temporary work exists. As the elapsed time since the start of unem-
ployment increases, the job-finding probability in the absence of temporary
employment slowly converges to the job-finding probability in the situation
where temporary employment exists. Thus, although temporary employment
does not increase the probabilities of finding a regular job, it does lead to
a decrease in the unemployment duration. Instead of being unemployed,
people are employed in temporary jobs. We should note that the temporary
employment spell, as we defined it, may include periods of unemployment, but
as was shown in Section 4, this is only true for a minority of cases.
Figure 5 does not directly provide an estimate of the over-all effect of the
existence of temporary jobs on the over-all employment rate. To gauge the
order of magnitude of this, without the need to estimate and simulate a flexible
meta-model that allows for all possible transitions, we abstract from duration
dependence and heterogeneity, and we rely on external sources to estimate
the transition rate from employment to unemployment. Van den Berg and
Ridder (1998) use Dutch data from the same period as in this paper to obtain a
monthly estimate of 0.005. Using slightly more recent data, and correcting for
structural unemployment, Ridder and van den Berg (2003) obtain an estimate
of 0.0074. With a transition rate from unemployment to employment equal to
0.03 without temporary work, and equal to 0.045 with temporary work (Figs. 2
and 5; recall from the previous subsection that the probability of moving
to regular work is similar in both cases), we find that the employment rate
increases by four or by six percentage points due to the existence of temporary
jobs. As we do not account for transitions from regular work to temporary
work and back to regular work, these numbers may slightly underestimate the
total effect.
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5.5 Covariate effects
In this section, we examine whether the results presented in the previous
sections are uniformly valid for all types of individuals. Table 5 presents the
covariate effects on the individual transition rates. Note that a positive sign
indicates a higher transition probability and a shorter duration. Comparison
of the coefficients for “unemployment to regular” with the coefficients for
“temporary to regular” reveals the variation of the stepping-stone effect across
different types of individuals. Comparison of the coefficients for “unemploy-
ment to regular” with those for “unemployment to temporary” reveals the
take-up of the stepping-stone pathway.
Transition rates into regular work are higher in labour markets with many
vacancies per unemployed individual. This is generally found in the literature.
This relation, however, does not hold for the rate into temporary work, since
this rate seems to be less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations. This effect
Table 5 Estimation results of covariate effects
Unemployment Unemployment Temporary
to temporary job to regular job to regular job
Age/10 −0.331 (0.068)** −0.514 (0.057)** −0.284 (0.083)**
Female −1.719 (0.478)** 0.997 (0.365)** 0.065 (0.998)
Ethnicity (ref: native Dutch)
Male ethnic minority −1.513 (0.185)** −0.423 (0.253)* 0.713 (0.165)**
Female ethnic minority −1.435 (0.180)** −0.791 (0.067)** −1.275 (0.543)**
Education (ref: intermediate)
Low education level −0.264 (0.131)** −0.528 (0.117)** 0.121 (0.120)
High education level −0.306 (0.097)** 0.207 (0.101)** 0.446 (0.130)**
Region (ref: Randstad)
West 1.686 (0.207)** 0.500 (0.136)** −0.126 (0.172)
North 0.582 (0.153)** −0.694 (0.140)** −1.147 (0.204)**
East 0.876 (0.176)** 0.471 (0.136)** −0.323 (0.162)**
South 1.251 (0.189)** 0.149 (0.134) −0.921 (0.132)**
Children (ref: no children)
Man with children in household −0.065 (0.221) 0.216 (0.140) 1.669 (0.161)**
Woman with −0.317 (0.156)** −0.700 (0.136)** −0.587 (0.230)**
children in household
Partner (ref: no partner)
Man with working partner 0.226 (0.213) 0.662 (0.144)** −0.460 (0.154)**
Woman with working partner 0.252 (0.147)* 1.141 (0.136)** 0.692 (0.122)**
Man with non-working partner −0.258 (0.291) 0.467 (0.144)** −0.600 (0.217)**
Woman with −0.186 (0.168) 0.509 (0.112)**
non-working partner
Desired working hours per week
Men: desired working hours/10 −0.051 (0.086) 0.557 (0.095)** 0.009 (0.206)
Women: desired working hours/10 0.432 (0.098)** 0.115 (0.064)* 0.059 (0.133)
Temporary job preferred −0.249 (0.174) −0.766 (0.180)** 0.077 (0.117)
to regular job at start of unempl.
Vacancy/unemployment ratio 0.274 (0.172) 1.296 (0.266)** 1.498 (0.222)**
Standard errors in parentheses
*p = 0.10, two-sided significance; **p = 0.05, two-sided significance
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was also found for Spain in the study by Bover and Gómez (2004), which
also showed that (in general) it is easier to become employed if one wants to
work more hours—although males seem to find temporary work more easily
if they prefer to work part-time. Older unemployed individuals need more
time to move into regular and temporary positions, as do individuals from the
ethnic minorities group. Unemployed individuals who prefer temporary work
to regular work do not, as might be expected, often make the direct transition
from unemployment to a regular job.
Having a partner has a strong positive effect on the direct transition from
unemployment to regular work. This effect is well known (for an overview
of studies on this issue, see Ginter and Zavodny 2001). There is no generally
accepted reason for this phenomenon. Partners may make individuals more
productive and, therefore, more attractive to employers. Alternatively,
individuals who are successful on the labour market may have characteristics
that also make them attractive on the marriage market. The effect we find is
larger for working partners than for non-working partners, which supports the
selection hypothesis.
Men with children at home have a higher transition rate from temporary
to regular work. These men may be under greater pressure to provide a
satisfactory level of family income and thus may be eager to transform their
insecure temporary job into a more secure regular position. We also find a
negative effect for men with a partner, perhaps indicating that having a partner
reduces the urgency for provision of a satisfactory level of family income by the
man alone.
5.5.1 Stepping-stone effect heterogeneity
The variation of the stepping-stone effect across different types of individuals
is revealed by the comparison of the coefficients for “unemployment to
regular” with the coefficients for “temporary to regular”. From a policy
perspective, it is particularly interesting to focus on disadvantaged groups,
notably ethnic minorities (defined as the four largest groups originating from
Surinam, the Netherlands Antilles, Morocco and Turkey), the low-educated
and women. For example, Netherlands Statistics notes that non-western
ethnic minorities have unemployment rates that are more than four times as
high as native Dutch individuals—in 2003, 17.6% versus 4.3% (unemployment
benefits and social assistance). The stepping-stone effect may be larger
for ethnic minorities if employers who are reluctant to hire them can use
temporary contracts to screen them. In that case, it makes sense to stimulate
unemployed immigrants to register at temporary work agencies. Table 5
shows that there is a difference between male and female ethnic minorities.
The stepping-stone effect is much higher for male ethnic minorities than for
native Dutch males, since the coefficient for temporary to regular work is
positive and the coefficient from unemployment to regular work is negative.
Clearly, this supports policy measures that stimulate the use of temporary
work by ethnic minorities—for example, by helping them to register at
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temporary work agencies. For females, both coefficients for ethnic minorities
are smaller than for native Dutch females—even more so for temporary to
regular work than from unemployment to regular work. This implies a smaller
stepping-stone effect for women from ethnic minorities than for native Dutch
women.
The stepping-stone effect varies with other characteristics as well. It is
higher for the low educated than for the high educated, for men compared
to women, for singles compared to persons with a partner, for men preferring
part-time work compared to men preferring full-time work, for people prefer-
ring regular work compared to those preferring temporary work and for people
in the Randstad compared to those in other regions.
5.5.2 Use of the stepping-stone pathway
Given the presence of a stepping-stone effect, comparison of the coefficients
for “unemployment to regular” with those for “unemployment to temporary”
sheds light on the relevance of the pathway through temporary work to regular
work. In the better phase of the business cycle, with many vacancies and low
unemployment, the use of temporary jobs as stepping-stones is smaller than
in recessions. With respect to ethnic minorities, an eye-catching result is that
ethnic minorities, both males and females, make little use of temporary jobs.
For male ethnic minorities, we established the substantial potential benefit of
temporary employment as a stepping stone towards regular work. This adds
to the support for policy measures that stimulate the use of temporary work
by ethnic minorities. The same holds true for individuals with low education
levels. Compared to more highly educated individuals, they have a higher
potential benefit from temporary jobs, but they use it less often.
With regard to other characteristics, the use of temporary employment
is higher for men compared to women, for men without children compared
to men with children, for women with children compared to those without
children, for singles compared to individuals with a partner and for men
preferring full-time jobs compared to men preferring part-time work.
It is the combination of the stepping-stone effect and the take-up that
determines the actual effects of temporary jobs. To illustrate this, Fig. 6a,
b shows the equivalents of Figs. 4 and 5 for male ethnic minorities versus
native Dutch men. As these figures show, the men from the ethnic minority
group experience a greater stepping-stone effect than native Dutch men. Their
probability of having found regular work after 6 years is 4.3 percentage points
(or 6%) higher in a situation with temporary employment than in the situation
without. For native men, we see no such effect. The effect of temporary work
on the total probability of employment is larger for native men than for
those from ethnic groups. Native Dutch men have an 11 percentage points
(or 13.5%) higher probability of having found employment in a situation with
temporary employment than in a situation without this type of work. For ethnic
men the difference is nine percentage points (or 12.5%).
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Fig. 6 a Estimated cumulative probability of finding regular work, with and without temporary
employment, for males from ethnic minorities versus native Dutch men. b Estimated cumulative
reemployment probability, with and without temporary employment, for males from ethnic
minorities versus native Dutch men
5.5.3 Unobserved heterogeneity
Table 6 presents the estimates of the parameters of the unobserved hetero-
geneity distribution. As always, in models with unobserved heterogeneity,
the heterogeneity distribution estimates are difficult to interpret. First, they
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Table 6 Estimation results for unobserved heterogeneity
V(URlow) = 5.335 (0.382)* V(URhigh) = 2.767 (0.299)*
V(TRlow) = 4.488 (0.969)* V(TRhigh) = 2.601 (0.834)*
V(UTlow) = 6.233 (0.540)* 0.370 (0.005)* (type 1) 0.245 (0.004)* (type 3)
V(UThigh) = 3.654 (0.410)* 0.218 (0.003)* (type 2) 0.167 (0.001)* (type 4)
Standard errors in parentheses
*p = 0.05, two-sided significance
are determined by the set of included covariates. Secondly, the discrete
heterogeneity distribution should be interpreted as an approximation of the
true distribution. We merely make two remarks. First, the variances and
correlations of the unobserved heterogeneity terms are significantly different
from zero. This implies that a model that does not take the selection into
temporary work into account is misspecified and leads to incorrect inference.
Secondly, we use likelihood ratio tests to test our model against models without
unobserved heterogeneity terms and with more heterogeneity terms. None of
Table 7 Random effects
analysis log hourly wage
of regular jobs
Standard errors in
parentheses
*p = 0.05, two-sided
significance
Estimated coefficient
Intercept 0.734 (0.311)∗
Regular job found directly −0.084 (0.041)∗
from unemployment
Female −0.021 (0.070)
Log age 0.540 (0.086)∗
Ethnic minority −0.036 (0.115)
Education level
(reference: intermediate level)
Low educated −0.053 (0.041)
High educated 0.297 (0.054)∗
Region (reference: Randstad)
West −0.046 (0.146)
North −0.045 (0.151)
East −0.067 (0.145)
South −0.029 (0.144)
Female Reentrant −0.237 (0.079)∗
Children in the household
(reference: no children)
Man with children −0.052 (0.072)
Woman with children −0.070 (0.063)
Partner (reference: no partner)
Man with non-working partner 0.157 (0.082)
Woman with non-working partner −0.308 (0.106)∗
Man with working partner 0.127 (0.075)
Woman with working partner 0.077 (0.068)
Number of observations = 279
R2 within = 0.037
R2 between = 0.365
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the models was found to be preferable to the current model. The main results
are insensitive to the assumed family of discrete unobserved heterogeneity
distributions.
5.6 Quality of jobs found
A limitation of analyses of the effects of temporary work on the duration until
regular work is that they typically ignore effects on the type and quality of the
accepted job. Our dataset supplies job characteristics at survey dates of jobs
held at survey dates, but it does not supply job characteristics otherwise (like
at the moment of job acceptance or in between survey dates). We observe the
wage for 379 of the total of 507 regular jobs in our sample, whereas other job
characteristics are even less frequently observed. Table 7 presents estimates
of a random effect analysis of the hourly wage in these 379 jobs. Results
indicate that regular jobs that are found directly pay lower wages than regular
jobs found by way of temporary work. Table 8 presents estimates of a logit
analysis on the availability of employer provided training. In this dimension,
regular jobs do not differ from regular jobs found via temporary work. Some
studies analyse the effect of non-standard employment on health insurance
(e.g. Ditsler et al. 2005). For the Netherlands, this is not a relevant question
since each Dutch citizen is covered by health insurance.
Table 8 Logit analysis of
training paid by employer
in regular jobs
Standard errors in
parentheses
*p = 0.05, two-sided
significance
Estimated coefficient
Intercept −1.606 (1.770)∗
Regular job found directly −0.311 (0.248)
from unemployment
Female −0.594 (0.431)
Log age −0.610 (0.522)
Ethnic minority −0.788 (0.810)
Education level
Low educated −0.093 (0.259)
High educated 0.792 (0.307)∗
Region
West 0.017 (0.387)
North −0.053 (0.493)
East 0.001 (0.388)
South −0.009 (0.381)
Female Reentrant −0.329 (0.476)
Children in the household
(reference: no children)
Man with children −0.225 (0.413)
Woman with children 0.369 (0.377)
Partner (reference: no partner)
Man with non-working partner 0.120 (0.477)
Woman with non-working partner −0.096 (0.691)
Man with working partner 0.170 (0.429)
Woman with working partner 0.348 (0.417)
Number of observations = 419
R2 = 0.047
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The data also allow us to address the stability of jobs. We extend our
main model with the duration of the regular job, where the way in which
the job is found—directly or by way of temporary employment—is used as
an explanatory variable. With respect to the unobserved heterogeneity mass-
point distribution, we assume that the unobserved heterogeneity regarding
the duration of the regular job is positively related to the unobserved het-
erogeneity in the transition from unemployment to regular employment and
Table 9 Extended model,
incorporating regular-job
durations: estimated
coefficients of the hazard of
the regular-job duration
Standard errors in
parentheses
*p = 0.10, two-sided
significance; **p = 0.05,
two-sided significance
Estimated
coefficient
Baseline hazard 4–6 months, −0.449 (0.122)∗∗
Baseline hazard 7–9 months 0.690 (0.102)
Baseline hazard 10–12 months 0.354 (0.134)
Baseline hazard 13–15 months −0.512 (0.166)∗∗
Baseline hazard 16–18 months −0.106 (0.122)∗∗
Baseline hazard 19–21 months −0.016 (0.127)∗∗
Baseline hazard 22–24 months 0.865 (0.129)
Baseline hazard 25–30 months −0.284 (0.130)∗∗
Baseline hazard 31–36 months 0.358 (0.123)
Baseline hazard >=37 months 0.380 (0.120)
Regular job found directly from 0.373 (0.165)
unemployment (ref: regular job
found via temporary job)
Age/10 0.006 (0.062)∗
Female −0.689 (0.476)∗∗
Ethnicity (ref: native Dutch)
Male ethnic minority 0.435 (0.077)
Female ethnic minority 0.687 (0.302)
Education (ref: intermediate)
Low education level −0.047 (0.103)∗∗
High education level −0.263 (0.098)∗∗
Region (ref: Randstad)
West 0.524 (0.155)
North 0.656 (0.166)
East −0.004 (0.150)∗∗
South 0.532 (0.156)
Children (ref: no children)
Man with children in household 0.057 (0.139)
Woman with children in household 0.074 (0.156)
Partner (ref: no partner)
Man with working partner 0.109 (0.136)
Woman with working partner 0.002 (0.120)∗∗
Man with non-working partner 0.152 (0.124)
Woman with non-working partner −0.334 (0.111)∗∗
Desired working hours per week
Men: desired working hours/10 0.204 (0.096)
Women: desired working hours/10 0.601 (0.072)
Temporary job preferred to regular job 1.049 (0.129)
at start of unemployment
Vacancy/unemployment ratio −0.117 (0.089)∗∗
Mass points
V(RE1) −4.712 (0.363)∗∗
V(RE2) −5.539 (0.375)∗∗
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Table 10 Destination state after leaving regular jobs, comparing regular jobs found directly from
unemployment and regular jobs found via temporary work
Destination Regular job found by way Regular job found directly
of temporary job (%) from unemployment (%)
Other regular job 67 67
Temporary job 23 15
Unemployed 4a 12a
Out of the labour force 4 3
Unknown 2 4
aDifference significant at 5% level
the transition from temporary to regular employment. Table 9 reports the
estimated coefficients of the hazard rate of the regular-job duration. As a
sensitivity analysis, we also estimate a model in which the above assumption
concerning the signs of the relations between the unobserved-heterogeneity
terms is relaxed, resulting in eight instead of four mass points. According
to a likelihood ratio test, the more general model does not give a better fit
than the restricted model presented in Table 9. A positive sign indicates a
higher transition rate out of work and a shorter duration of the regular job.
The results indicate that the duration of the regular job does not depend on
whether it is directly preceded by a temporary job or by unemployment. If
anything, regular jobs that are found directly from unemployment last shorter
than regular jobs found via temporary work. Simple t tests (Table 10) also show
that the reason why people separate from their regular job does not differ
significantly between directly and indirectly found regular jobs. Regarding
the exit state, there is a slight difference: jobs found by way of temporary
employment end less often in unemployment and more often in a transition to
another temporary job. However, this difference is not statistically significant.
6 Conclusion
This paper analysed the effect of temporary employment for the employment
opportunities of unemployed individuals. The stepping-stone effect, defined
as the increase in the hazard rate of finding regular employment as a result
of the acceptance of a temporary job, is not represented by a single model
parameter in the current set-up. Examining duration dependence patterns
indicates that newly employed temporary workers have a slightly lower rate
into regular work than unemployed workers. Workers who accept a temporary
job are initially strongly attached to that job. The exit rate from temporary
work, however, becomes higher than the exit rate from unemployment after
1.5 years in temporary employment. The fact that the transition rate from
temporary work to regular work increases during the temporary job indicates
that the accumulation of human capital may be a reason for employers to
prefer individuals who have occupied a temporary job. An increasingly larger
social network among employed workers may also explain this.
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As we have shown in this paper, the over-all effect of temporary work is
more easily studied with an outcome measure that time aggregates over effects
on instantaneous transition rates, than by studying the instantaneous rates
themselves. For this purpose, we have used the cumulative probabilities of
moving into a regular job, measured at various points of time after entry into
unemployment. After 6 months, 12% of the flow into regular work consists of
transitions through temporary work, while after 6 years, this increases up to
43%. The probability of having had regular work within a certain amount of
time after entry into unemployment is not affected by the existence of tem-
porary jobs. This probability hardly differs from the counterfactual situation
without temporary work. The effect of temporary work on the unemployment
duration is unambiguously negative. In sum, even though individuals need to
search as long for a regular job as in the absence of temporary jobs, they are
employed in temporary positions instead of being unemployed all the time. All
of these results are obtained while correcting for selection effects associated
with moving into temporary work. We should re-emphasise that we abstract
from the potentially negative effects of the existence of temporary jobs on
the transition rate from unemployment directly into regular work (i.e. without
intervening temporary job spell) and from equilibrium effects of a general
increase in temporary work. With this caveat in mind, it is worthwhile to
mention that in a specific sense, our results do not lend support to the often-
heard claim that temporary jobs substitute away regular jobs. Specifically,
the acceptance of a temporary job does not lead an individual to spend less
time in regular work. Also, we found evidence that regular jobs found by
way of temporary jobs pay higher wages than regular jobs taken directly from
unemployment.
The stepping-stone results apply for virtually all workers, including those
with a relatively weak labour market position. We have shown that the
stepping-stone effect is somewhat higher for the low-educated than for higher-
educated workers, for (male) ethnic minorities compared to native Dutch, for
men compared to women and for singles compared to persons with a partner.
However, groups differ not only with respect to the potential advantage
temporary work offers them as a stepping-stone but also regarding the take-
up of temporary work (and thus of the stepping-stone). The use of temporary
employment is higher for men compared to women and for singles compared
to individuals with a partner. Ethnic minorities are a special case in this respect.
Although male ethnic minorities experience a high stepping-stone effect on the
transition rate to regular work, they rarely flow into temporary jobs, so they do
not benefit from the effect. This suggests that policy measures should be taken
to stimulate the use of temporary work by ethnic minorities, for example by
helping them to register at temporary work agencies.
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Appendix: The effect of temporary jobs on the probability of moving into
regular work
Consider the model extension where θT R depends on the time τ since entry
into temporary work as well as on the current time t = τ + tUT since entry
into unemployment, where tUT denotes the moment of the transition into
temporary work, so θT R = θT R(τ , t). We define ST R(τ , tUT) as the survival
function of the duration in temporary work if the transition into in temporary
work occurs at tU E, so
ST R (τ, tUT) = exp
⎛
⎝−
τ∫
0
θT R (z, tUT + z)dz
⎞
⎠
We have to modify Eq. 1 accordingly, to
t∫
0
θUR (y) SUR (y) SUT (y) + θUT (y) SUT (y) SUR (y) (1 − ST R (t − y, y)) dy
(3)
Absence of treatment effects means that for all t and τ there holds that
θT R(τ, t) = θU R(t). This implies that ST R(t − y, y) = SU R(t)/SU R(y). If we sub-
stitute this into Eq. 3 and elaborate on this then, we simply obtain SU R(t). The
latter is also obtained if we substitute into Eq. 3 that θUT = 0 (notice that the
first parts of Eqs. 1 and 3 do not change when imposing that for all t and τ ,
there holds true that θT R(τ, t) = θU R(t)).
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